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CONTRACTS
I. ORAL MISREPRESENTATIONS OF MATERIAL FACT
The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled in South v. Sher-
wood Chevrolet, Inc.,1 that no error was committed'by the lower
court in allowing a jury to decide if an automobile dealer acted
fraudulently when he misrepresented the model year of a 1978
truck by putting a 1979 window sticker on it. The court held
that even though the purchaser had signed a written instrument
which stated the correct model information, he was not, as a
matter of law, precluded from bringing an action for fraud and
deceit. Thus, Sherwood Chevrolet further refines the court's in-
terpretation of the role of written documents in cases of fraud.2
The action against Sherwood Chevrolet arose from a sales
transaction with plaintiff, South, in January 1979. South visited
the dealership and specifically asked to see a 1979 truck. A sales-
man directed him to the vehicle he subsequently purchased.'
The window sticker on the truck stated it was a 1979 model, and
South purchased the truck apparently believing it to be a 1979
truck. Three months later when South attempted to sell the
truck, he discovered that it was actually a 1978 model. At the
time of the purchase, South had signed a sales agreement which
described the truck as a 1978 model. A 1978 owner's manual was
in the glove compartment, and the EPA sticker on the window
listed the estimated gas mileage for a 1978 truck.5 South had
also acquired a South Carolina registration card for a 1978
1. 277 S.C. 372, 287 S.E.2d 490 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Hutto v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 259 S.C. 170, 191 S.E.2d 7
(1972)(written agreement held not to preclude an action for fraud where agreement was
not made available to the plaintiff until four months after misrepresentation and the
plaintiff had made payments and incurred substantial damages); Moye v. Wilson Motors,
Inc., 254 S.C. 471, 176 S.E.2d (1970)(written agreement binding where no representation
made to customer as to contents of contract); Jones v. Cooper, 234 S.C. 477, 109 S.E.2d 5
(1959)(written agreement upheld where salesman's representations were "puffing," no
material representations were made which differed from the terms of the contract, and
the plaintiff could have ascertained the truth by reading the document he signed).
3. 277 S.C. at 373, 287 S.E.2d at 491.
4. Id. at 375, 287 S.E.2d at 492.
5. Id. at 373, 287 S.E.2d at 491.
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model truck.'
South brought suit against Sherwood Chevrolet seeking
damages for fraud. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff
and awarded South $1,750 in actual and punitive damages. Sher-
wood Chevrolet appealed and the South Carolina Supreme
Court, in a three to two decision, affirmed.
On appeal, the supreme court directly addressed only two of
the nine elements necessary to prove fraud: the speaker's knowl-
edge of the falsity of the representation or reckless disregard of
its truth or falsity, and the hearer's right to rely on the represen-
tation. The majority found the central issue to be whether Sher-
wood Chevrolet's representation that the truck was a 1979 model
was made in reckless disregard of the truth. There was conflict-
ing testimony on what the salesman had actually said to South
and on how the 1978 truck had been marked with a 1979 sticker.
The court held that these factual determinations were properly
put to the jury, thus affirming the lower court's denial of defen-
dant's motions for nonsuit, directed verdict and judgment n.o.v.7
The supreme court based its decision on Carroll Motors,
Inc. v. Purcell,8 which it found to be analogous to South. In Car-
roll Motors, a sales agent represented that a mileage odometer
was correct to the best of his knowledge. He had not checked the
odometer, and the court held that whether the statement was
made in reckless disregard of the truth was for the jury to deter-
mine.' The court concluded that fraud may be inferred when
one recklessly makes a false material representation without any
knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion. 10
The court rejected Sherwood's argument that South was
precluded from recovery for fraud because the sales agreement
that he had signed clearly stated the truck was a 1978 model.
Sherwood claimed South had no right to rely on the representa-
6. Id. at 375, 287 S.E.2d at 492.
7. Id. at 374, 287 S.E.2d at 491-92.
8. 273 S.C. 745, 259 S.E.2d 604 (1979).
9. Id. at 748, 259 S.E.2d at 606.
10. Id. at 748, 259 S.E.2d at 606 (quoting Gary v. Jordan, 236 S.C. 144, 158, 113
S.E.2d 730, 737 (1960)). Gary was an action for fraud and deceit on the ground that six
of twenty cows bought by Gary from Jordan were positive reactors to brucclosis. Out-
breaks of the disease in Gary's herd necessitated slaughter of thirty cows and quarantine
of the remainder. At the time of the purchase, Jordan had assured Gary that the cows
were "clean."
[Vol. 35
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tion since the truth could have been ascertained by reading the
sales agreement. Sherwood based its argument on Moye v. Wil-
son Motors, Inc.11 The court, however, distinguished Moye by
pointing out that there the defendant made no direct represen-
tation to the purchaser on the contents of the contract before he
signed it. Sherwood, however, directly misrepresented the truck
model to South and then recorded that information differently
on the sales agreement.12
In deciding South, the court made no reference to Wood-
ward v. Todd."s In a situation similar to that in South, the
Woodward court unanimously decided to bar a charge of fraud
because of a written document signed by the purchasers. The
Woodwards purchased a home from Todd's Mobile Homes. Dur-
ing the course of negotiations a salesman asserted that the total
purchase price would be $8,734. The Woodwards signed an as-
sumption of liability agreement in which the total purchase
price of the home was listed as $10,004.49,1" but they did not
read the agreement when they signed it. 'The court held that
they could not complain of fraud in the misrepresentation of the
price because they could have learned the truth by reading the
document they signed.1 5
While Woodward appears to be analogous to South, there
are some factual differences. The only representation made to
the Woodwards was oral, while the representations made to
South were both oral (the salesman's statement) and written
(the sticker on the truck). Furthermore, another avenue of relief
was available to the Woodwards. They could have brought a
contract action for the failure of Todd's Mobile Homes to fulfill
promises relating to the delivery and set-up of the mobile
home.1
The court stated in South that the buyer had no recourse
11. 254 S.C. 471, 176 S.E.2d 147 (1970). Moye was an action for fraud and deceit on
the ground that a salesman for Wilson Motors had misrepresented a comprehensive-
collision insurance policy that he had obtained for Moye. Moye complained that the
salesman had not called attention to his cancellation provision in the policy.
12. 277 S.C. at 373, 287 S.E.2d at 491.
13. 270 S.C. 82, 240 S.E.2d 641 (1978).
14. Id. at 84-85, 240 S.E.2d at 642.
15. Id. at 86, 240 S.E.2d at 643.
16. Id., 240 S.E.2d at 643.
19831
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other than an action for fraud and deceit.17 However, this con-
clusion may not have been entirely accurate. South might have
brought an action for breach of express warranty. In an action
for breach of express warranty no showing of reckless disregard
is necessary, and attorney's fees may be recovered under the
Magnuson-Moss Act.18 On the other hand, an express warranty
action, unlike a suit for fraud, does not allow for recovery of pu-
nitive damages. This advantage of a fraud action did not seem to
greatly benefit South in light of the limited recovery he received
for both actual and punitive damages. In addition, there may be
a question of whether South could have won an express war-
ranty action since the court could have denied the admission of
parol evidence if it had determined the written agreement was
intended as a final expression of the agreement of both parties.19
Regardless of the cause of action a purchaser in South's po-
sition chooses, the written document plays a significant role in
the outcome of the case. As it applies to an action in fraud, the
court's decision in South will not negate the doctrine that one
who has signed a written instrument cannot complain of fraud
in the misrepresentation of its contents when the truth could
have been ascertained by reading it. While the court does indi-
cate that this doctrine will not automatically preclude consum-
ers from alleging fraud, the opinion does not make clear exactly
what factors the court will examine to determine one's right to
rely on misrepresentations of material fact when those material
facts are correctly represented in a subsequently signed writing.
In South it appears that one can complain of fraud if a material
misrepresentation concerning the contents of the written instru-
ment is made, but the decision in Woodward casts some doubt
on this assumption. Since Woodward was not discussed in
South, it is unknown how the court would have distinguished it
or if it would have been overturned. As a result, the court's reac-
tion in the future when faced with a similar situation is
uncertain.
Despite the lack of distinct guidelines, South v. Sherwood
Chevrolet, Inc. does have an important message. It serves to
warn sellers that their representations of material fact concern-
17. 277 S.C. at 373, 287 S.E.2d at 491.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (1976).
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-202, -316(1) (1976).
[Vol. 35
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ing consumer products should be made with careful regard for
the truth. Sellers cannot always rely on a subsequent written in-
strument signed by the consumer to protect themselves from
charges of fraud.
II. DISCLAIMER OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
In Hartman v. Jensen's, Inc., 0 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that a disclaimer in a contract was ineffective to ex-
clude an implied warranty of merchantability. Applying the con-
sumer-oriented disclaimer provision of the South Carolina Uni-
form Commercial Code, the court found that the location of
disclaimers under the bold heading "TERMS OF WAR-
RANTY" created an ambiguity which made it unlikely that a
consumer would be alerted to the exclusion of warranties ap-
pearing below. In so holding, the court followed the trend of de-
nying merchants the opportunity to protect themselves from
breach of warranty actions with disclaimers placed in a contract
in such a way that a consumer would not realize they are
disclaimers.
In June 1977, Carl and Wyetta Hartman purchased a mo-
bile home through Jensen's, Inc. for $33,741.76.21 Standard
Coach Sales, Inc. agreed to manufacture the home according to
certain floor plans and specifications chosen by the Hartmans. 2
At the time of the purchase, the Hartmans signed a preprinted
sales contract used by Jensen's. The warranty terms for the mo-
bile home were printed in a block on the lower left hand portion
of the front of the form. Only two terms were offered, and the
one checked stated that the home was not guaranteed by Jen-
sen's, but was subject to a limited warranty of Standard Coach
Sales, Inc.23 Also on the front page above the Hartmans' signa-
20. 277 S.C. 501, 289 S.E.2d 648 (1982).
21. Record at 3.
22. Id. at 13-14, 17.
23. The contract provided:
TERMS OF WARRANTY
THIS HOME NOT GUARANTEED.
NO GUARANTEE - NO SERVICE
THIS HOME NOT GUARANTEED BY
JENSEN'S, INC.
THIS HOME IS SUBJECT
TO A LIMITED WARRANTY OF
1983]
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tures was a sentence written in bold print directing attention to
the terms and conditions on the back of the form.2 4 The first
term on the back was a disclaimer printed in larger and darker
print than the other terms.2 5
After the Hartmans moved into the home, they discovered
defects in its construction,2 6 including structural problems and
differences between the unit as constructed and the specifica-
tions agreed upon by the Hartmans, Jensen's, and Standard
Coach Sales.27 Jensen's and Standard agreed to repair the de-
fects,28 but in so doing caused additional damage to the home.29
The Hartmans were forced to live elsewhere while the mobile
home was being repaired. 0
The Hartmans brought an action for negligence and breach
of warranties to recover for the defects in the home. A special
referee heard the evidence. His findings, accepted by the trial
judge, held that Jensen's and Standard Coach had breached ex-
press and implied warranties in the sale of the mobile home.31 A
judgment of $11,798.13 for actual and consequential damages
was awarded to the Hartmans.3 2 The supreme court unani-
mously affirmed the decision."
The supreme court sustained Jensen's liability on the issue
STANDARD COACH SALES, INC.
FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR, COPY
GIVEN TO PURCHASER.
Id. at 52.
24. The sentence stated: "THIS ORDER IS SUBJECT TO ALL THE TERMS
AND CONDITIONS SPECIFIED ON THE BACK OF THIS FORM AND I HAVE
READ THE MATTER ON THE BACK HEREOF AND AGREE TO IT AS A PART
OF THIS ORDER AS IF IT WERE PRINTED ABOVE MY SIGNATURE." Id.
25. The disclaimer stated: "JENSEN'S, INC. HEREBY EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS
ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING ANY IM-
PLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE, AND JENSEN'S, INC. NEITHER ASSUMES NOR AUTHORIZED ANY
OTHER PERSON TO ASSUME FOR IT ANY LIABILITY IN CONNECTION WiTH
THE SALE OF THE HOME." Id. at 53.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 14, 17, 19-20.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id. at 40-42.
30. Id. at 3.
31. 277 S.C. 502, 289 S.E.2d at 648.
32. Record at 74.
33. 277 S.C. at 504, 289 S.E.2d at 649.
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of implied warranty of merchantability. 4 Section 36-2-314(1) of
the South Carolina Code states: "[A] warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." The
court found that Jensen's, Inc. was a retailer of mobile homes
and, as such, was a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
In the contract of sale to the Hartmans, Jensen's had therefore
implied that the goods would be merchantable. The mobile
home did not meet the standards of merchantability as charac-
terized in section 36-2-314(2) of the Code because it was not fit
for the ordinary purposes for which it was bought.
3 5
An implied warranty of merchantability can be excluded or
modified, 6 and Jensen's contended at both the trial level and in
the supreme court that it had effectively done so in its contract
with the Hartmans. The court rejected this contention by apply-
ing the disclaimer requirements of the Code to the contract.3 7
For an exclusion of an implied warranty of merchantability to be
effective, the language of the disclaimer must include the word
merchantabilitys and be conspicuous. South Carolina's version
34. Id., 289 S.E.2d at 649.
35. Id. The court at this point in its opinion cites S.C. CODE ANN. §36-2-315 (1976),
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose provision. The court's wording in
its analysis, however, clearly indicates it is applying §36-2-314, the implied warranty of
merchantability provision.
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-314(1) (1976).
37. 277 S.C. at 503, 289 S.E.2d at 649.
38. Apart from the "TERMS OF WARRANTY" section, the Jensen's contract also
contained a disclaimer in the "TERMS AND CONDITIONS" section on the back. If the
requirements of S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316(2) (1976) are applied to this additional dis-
claimer, it would appear to be effective. It contains the word merchantability, attention
is drawn to it by the statement above the Hartmans' signatures on the front page, and its
position and bold print make it conspicuous. Jensen's argued this point in both its Brief,
Brief for Appellant at 14, and Reply Brief, Reply Brief for Appellant at 8-9. The court,
however, makes no reference to it. A possible reason for this omission is that the court
could not reach the issue of the effectiveness of the second disclaimer. Under the stan-
dard of review articulated in the case, the court was bound by the lower court's finding
of fact if it was supported by any competent evidence. 277 S.C. at 502, 289 S.E.2d at 648.
Since this case was an action at law rather than in equity, the supreme court did not use
the Two Judge Rule whereby it is bound by the finding of fact decided by a special
referee and concurred in by the trial judge. Both the appellant and respondents made
reference to the rule in their briefs. Brief for Respondents at 10; Reply Brief for Appel-
lant Jensen's, Inc. at 9. A good explanation of the scope of review available upon appeal
in civil cases is set out in Townes Associates, Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221
S.E.2d 773 (1976). The court found that the record sustained the trial judge's finding
concerning the ambiguity created by placing the disclaimer under the heading "TERMS
7
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of the Uniform Commercial Code additionally requires that the
disclaimer be specific, and states that if the inclusion of such
language creates an ambiguity in the contract as a whole it
should be resolved against the seller.3 9 The court upheld the
trial court's finding that Jensen's disclaimer was confusing be-
cause it was placed under the bold heading of "TERMS OF
WARRANTY." The court observed that the heading suggested
a grant of warranty rather than a disclaimer. As a result, the
plaintiff was not alerted that an exclusion of warranty was in-
tended; Jensen's disclaimer was therefore ineffective.4 °
Hartman v. Jensen's, Inc. warns merchants that the loca-
tion and wording of a disclaimer of implied warranty will con-
tinue to determine its effectiveness. To meet the additional re-
quirement of the South Carolina Code, a disclaimer should be
OF WARRANTY." 277 S.C. at 503, 289 S.E.2d at 649. The court, therefore, ended its
inquiry.
If the court had reached the issue of the second disclaimer, it might nevertheless
have found it ineffective. In South Carolina the additional requirement that the dis-
claimer be specific must be met. The meaning of this requirement is uncertain, but it
may require that the disclaimer contain additional language that explains the effect of
the disclaimer. See, Crystal, Consumer Product Warranty Litigation in South Carolina,
S.C.L. REv. 293, 342-43 (1980). Jensen's second disclaimer would fail on this point.
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316(2) (1976).
40. 277 S.C. 503-04, 289 S.E.2d at 649.
In holding that the placement of the disclaimer under the heading "TERMS OF
WARRANTY" negated the effectiveness of the disclaimer, the court found persuasive
Mack Trucks of Arkansas, Inc. v. Jet Asphalt and Rock Co., 246 Ark. 101, 437 S.W.2d
459 (1969), and Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268
A.2d 345 (1970). Although the court states that the circumstances of these cases are
similar to the situation before it, there is little analysis of them in Hartman.
In Mack Trucks, an action for breach of express and implied warranties brought
against the dealer and manufacturer of two diesel trucks, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
held that limitations made by the defendants to an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose were ineffective. The limitations were placed within the body of gen-
eral warranties under the headings "Vehicle Warranty" and "Supplement to Mack Stan-
dard Warranty Applicable to Mack Diesel Engines." The court found nothing in these
titles suggested the content of exclusions or modifications of the implied warranty, and
thus the disclaimer failed to meet the conspicuousness test. Placing a disclaimer under a
general warranty heading did not insure that the attention of the buyer could reasonably
be expected to be brought to it. 246 Ark. at 108-09, 437 S.W.2d at 463.
Gindy was an action involving a counterclaim for a breach of implied warranty of
merchantability in which the New Jersey Superior Court held that an exclusion to the
implied warranty asserted by the manufacturer was ineffective. The exclusion was under
the heading "WARRANTIES." The court stated that this heading not only failed to
make the exclusion conspicuous, but suggested to a buyer that warranties were included,
not excluded. 111 N.J. Super. at 391-92, 268 A.2d at 350.
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worded and placed in a way that alerts consumers to its pres-
ence and purpose.
Sylvia G. Eaves
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